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Summary  
Relational reasoning is a hallmark of sophisticated cognition in humans [1,2]. Does it exist in 
other primates? Despite some affirmative answers [3-11], there appears to be a wide gap in 
relational ability between humans and other primates—even other apes [1,2]. Here we test one 
possible explanation for this gap, motivated by developmental research showing that young 
humans often fail at relational reasoning tasks because they focus on objects instead of relations 
[12-14]. When asked, duck:duckling is like tiger:?, preschool children choose another duckling 
(object match) rather than a cub. If other apes share this focus on concrete objects, it could 
undermine their relational reasoning in similar ways. To test this, we compared great apes and 3-
year-old humans’ relational reasoning on the same spatial mapping task, with and without 
competing object matches. Without competing object matches, both children and Pan species 
(chimpanzees and bonobos) spontaneously used relational similarity, albeit children more so. But 
when object matches were present, only children responded strongly to them. We conclude that 
the relational gap is not due to great apes’ preference for concrete objects. In fact, young humans 
show greater object-focus than nonhuman apes. 
 
Results and Discussion 
We compared the performance of children and three species of nonhuman great apes—bonobos 
(Pan paniscus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo abelii)—on two tasks: 
(1) a relational task alone, (2) a relational task pitted against competing object matches. Few 
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prior studies have compared humans and apes on an identical relational task [6,7; also 4-5 with 
baboons]; none have done so where relational matches compete with object matches.  
Subjects saw two identical three-tiered boxes placed side-by-side (Figure 1). They 
watched as the experimenter placed the bait—a toy for children, food for nonhuman apes—in a 
container at one of the locations (top, middle, or bottom tier) in the Hiding Box (Box 1). Their 
task was to find the corresponding bait in the Search Box (Box 2) [14].  They were rewarded if 
they searched correctly. After each search trial, there was a memory trial in which subjects tried 
to retrieve the original bait in the Hiding Box. 
 In Phase 1 (relational task alone), we tested whether subjects were sensitive to relational 
matches—whether they would use relational alignment in their search. To do this, we created 
two between-subject conditions: Aligned and Shifted, differing in the rule that linked the hiding 
location with the search location. In the Aligned condition, there was a spatial relational 
mapping from one box to the other: toptop, middlemiddle, and bottombottom. In the 
Shifted condition, the rule was topmiddle, middlebottom, bottomtop—a deterministic 
rule, but without alignment of parallel spatial relations. 
Both rules are perfectly regular, so the task can be passed without attending to the parallel 
relational structure. However, if subjects readily notice and use the analogous spatial relational 
structures between the two boxes, then performance in the Aligned condition should be better. 
Important differences distinguish the current task from [7] where locations of the boxes were 
connected by lines/tubes and arranged in vertical arrays, potentially permitting gravity-driven 
cues regarding the correspondence (see also [8]). As in previous studies with children [13-15], 
subjects received no prior relational training.  
4  
 
 
 
The results showed that both Pan species and children reaped the relational benefit; 
Pongo did not. Children in the Aligned group searched correctly 68% of the time, versus 21% in 
the Shifted group (F(1, 22) = 39.22, p < .001). Likewise, Pan’s search performance was 
significantly better in the Aligned (45%) than in the Shifted condition (24%), F(1, 10) = 21.29, p 
= .001. Pongo showed no advantage for Aligned (39%) over Shifted (33%), F(1, 4) = .64, p = 
.47), see Figure 3. 
Children performed significantly better (68%) in the relationally aligned condition than 
Pan (45%), F(1, 16) = 6.5, p < .05, consistent with claims of human relational superiority (1, 2). 
The human advantage was specific to relational reasoning; performance in the Shifted condition 
was equally poor in children (21%) and Pan (24%).) However, these findings also demonstrate 
sensitivity to parallel relational structure in Pan, contrary to claims that relational ability is 
lacking in nonhuman apes (2).  
We next analyzed the patterns of retrieval: whether subjects remembered the bait’s 
location in the Hiding Box. This analysis is important because failure to remember the initial bait 
location could account for differences in search performance. Children (Aligned = 80% correct; 
Shifted = 64%) and Pan (Aligned = 66%, Shifted = 68%) showed good memory for the original 
bait location (all above chance (33%), minimum t(5) = 3.87, p < .05), with no significant 
differences between Children and Pan. Thus, the superior performance of children and Pan 
species in the Aligned versus Shifted condition was due to relational ability, not memory.  
Comparison of the first and last three trials showed no evidence of learning for any 
species (minimum F(1, 4) = 4, p = .116). The advantage of relational alignment emerged even 
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within the first three trials: Children Aligned = 75% versus Shifted = 11%; Pan Aligned = 50% 
vs. Shifted = 33%. 
In sum, a search task involving a relational mapping rule was easier for children and Pan 
than one involving an equally deterministic but relationally arbitrary rule. This evidence of 
relational ability in our closest living relatives (Pan) does not extend to orangutans, who 
performed similarly under both conditions. But unlike children and Pan, orangutans also 
performed poorly in retrieval (Aligned = 46%, Shifted = 37%, minimum t(2) = .601, p = .609), 
so they may have generally failed to grasp the task. This accords with [7] who reported that four-
year-old children and Pan (chimpanzees and bonobos) succeeded at a different spatial mapping 
task but gorillas and orangutans did not. 
The greater sensitivity to relational similarity in humans surely contributes to the 
analogical gap between humans and other apes, but it may not be the sole cause. Phase 2 tested 
another possible cause: that great apes fail to employ relational reasoning because they focus on 
objects instead of relations. Such is the case for human children: when relational similarity is 
pitted against object similarity, they robustly prefer the object over the relational match [12-16]. 
Prior evidence that nonhuman apes tend to be concrete in their reasoning [17] raises the 
possibility that the effect of competing object matches may be especially strong for great apes.  
To test this, in Phase 2, conducted after a delay, we introduced object matches to the task 
(Figure 2). All subjects from Phase 1 went on to Phase 2 except for one chimpanzee who 
dropped out. All subjects remained in the same condition (Aligned or Shifted) in both phases. As 
in Phase 1, subjects saw a bait hidden in Box 1 and then searched in Box 2. As before, the bait in 
Box 2 was hidden in either a parallel relational pattern (Aligned condition) or in a shifted pattern 
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(Shifted). But whereas in Phase 1 all containers were identical, in Phase 2 each box contained 
three distinctive containers. The same three types of containers were used in each box, but, 
crucially, the containers were distributed differently in the two boxes: the top-to-bottom pattern 
was ABC in Box 1 and CAB in Box 2 (Figure 2). Thus, object matches competed with the 
relationally aligned rule in the Aligned condition and reinforced the arbitrary rule in the Shifted 
condition. If subjects focus on object matches, they should do well in the Shifted condition, but 
poorly in the Aligned condition.  
As expected, children focused strongly on object matches: they excelled in the Shifted 
condition but performed at chance in the Aligned condition (Shifted = 70%, Aligned = 28%, F(1, 
22) = 19.78, p < .001). This is the opposite pattern from Phase 1, where children performed 
better in Aligned than in Shifted (Figure 3). When object matches were present, children’s 
reasoning was highly concrete.  
Surprisingly, this was not the case for the nonhuman apes (Figure 4). Neither Pan nor 
Pongo took advantage of object matches to improve their performance in the Shifted condition. 
Unlike children, Pan performed equally in the Shifted (33%) and Aligned (31%), F(1, 9) = .08, p 
= .78. The same is true for Pongo: Shifted = 26% vs. Aligned = 41% (F(1, 4) = 3.29, p = .14). 
All groups of Pan and Pongo searched at chance level (minimum t(5) = -1.03, p = .35).  As 
before, there was no learning across trials: performance in the first and last three trials did not 
differ in any species (minimum F(1, 4) = .143, p = .725). 
 Because all subjects stayed within the same condition throughout, they could have simply 
carried the Phase 1 rule over to Phase 2. To test this, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with Phase as a within-subject factor, and Species and Condition as between-subject factors. 
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There was no main effect of Phase, but there was a significant interaction of Phase x Species x 
Condition, F(2, 35) = 14.91, p < .001. Children’s performance changed significantly from Phase 
1 to Phase 2, declining in Aligned (F(1, 11) = 27.9, p < .001) but improving in Shifted (F(1, 11) 
= 37.3, p < .001). When object matches conflicted with relational matches, children responded 
strongly to object matches, virtually ignoring the relational alignment regardless of prior training.  
The two Pan species did not show such an object focus; those in the Shifted condition 
performed at chance (33%, t(5) = .058, p = .96).  However, Pan’s decline in performance from 
Phase 1 (45%) to Phase 2 (31%) suggests some sensitivity to the competing object matches (F(1, 
4) = 11.14, p = .029). 
The dampened performance of Pan in Phase 2 was not due to poor memory for the initial 
bait location—their memory was excellent (Shifted = 84%, Aligned = 86%, minimum t(4) = 
23.97, p < .001), comparable to children’s (Shifted = 81%, Aligned = 72%, minimum t(11) = 
6.04, p < .001).  
The orangutans (Pongo) showed no change from Phase 1 to 2 in either condition 
(Aligned (F(1, 2) = 1.0 p = .42; Shifted (F(1, 2) = 1.34, p = .37),  performing at chance in both 
phases. Retrieval was also at chance in both conditions (Shifted = 43%, Aligned = 52%, 
minimum t(2) = 1.57, p = .26), suggesting they may not have understood the task. 
Conclusions 
There are two main findings. First, our closest relatives (Pan) spontaneously attend to 
relational similarity. These results counter the claim (2) that nonhuman apes lack relational 
ability, and extend prior findings on relational tasks [6,7,10]. Second, our findings are the first to 
document greater attention to object similarity among human children than among nonhuman 
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apes. When object matches were pitted against relational matches, children focused strongly on 
the objects while Pan and Pongo did not. 
We are not suggesting that great apes cannot make object matches. In fact, apes (and 
many other species) succeed at object-matching tasks such as the Match-to-Sample (MTS) Task: 
given A, choose A not B [2,9]—albeit typically with numerous training trials. The great apes 
were given only 18 trials in Phase 2. Had they been given more trials, we expect that they would 
have taken advantage of object matches. 
What is important here is the overall pattern of attention to relational vs. object similarity. 
Both human children and the two Pan species benefitted from a relational alignment (Phase 1) 
(though children benefitted more). However, only children benefitted from the presence of object 
matches (Phase 2). These results show a different profile of attention to object versus relational 
similarity between humans and other great apes. 
 There is some precedent for non-attention to object matches in a different primate 
species, baboons (Papio papio) [3]. Given a challenging relational-match-to-sample (RMTS) 
task (given sample AA, choose BB, not CD) 6 of 29 baboons initially trained on MTS passed 
this task with a minimum of 15,000 trials. When five of the successful animals were then given a 
further RMTS task with conflicting object matches, they showed no propensity to match objects. 
Likewise, two hooded crows (Corvus corone) initially trained on MTS succeeded in the RMTS 
task, and did no better on physical identity trials than on purely relational trials [18].  
While young children’s object focus can interfere with their relational reasoning, it can 
also have the opposite effect. For example, 4-year-olds who were shown a bicycle (or a tricycle) 
with two round wheels labeled “a dax” extended the novel label to similar-looking round glasses 
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but not to another vehicle (a skateboard). Children missed the shared category vehicle because 
they were focused on object commonalities. But in the same study, when children were shown a 
bicycle and a tricycle, they extended the novel label to the skateboard [19]. This is when 
attention to object similarity is useful: the similarity between the bicycle and tricycle invited 
children to compare the exemplars, allowing them to perceive the shared relational commonality 
(the vehicle category). Our finding that great apes lack a strong proclivity for object matching 
suggests that this initial invitation to compare may not be available to them. Over time, the 
accumulated effects of object comparisons may contribute to the human advantage in analogical 
reasoning. 
Language, objects and relations. Our comparison of humans and great apes’ relational 
reasoning cannot avoid discussing the seemingly biggest difference of all—language. Indeed, 
evidence from both humans and apes attests that relational symbols can support relational 
reasoning [1,14,20-23]. The present findings rule out the possibility that language—or even prior 
experience with relational symbols—is essential for the emergence of relational reasoning. The 
bonobos and chimpanzees in the current study were symbolically naïve, but nonetheless were 
sensitive to matching spatial relations (see also [7,8]). However, given the evidence that 
relational language can facilitate relational reasoning, it is possible that children’s superior 
relational insight in our study was enhanced by language. Thus, children may have possessed 
both a species-level biological advantage in relational ability and a further advantage due to 
cultural-linguistic learning.  
Language learning may also contribute to children’s sensitivity to object matches. There 
is evidence that children’s propensity to focus on objects is not inborn, but develops over the first 
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2-3 years [24-26]—a period during which children acquire their beginning vocabularies, which 
in many cultures consist largely of concrete and animate nouns [27-30].  By 9-10 months, infants 
pay more attention to labeled than to unlabeled objects [31,32]. This early focus on learning 
object names may heighten attention to objects among children.  
The largest difference between children and the two Pan species was that children 
focused strongly on object matches, but Pan did not. This is the opposite of what would be 
expected if great apes were more concrete in their cognition than humans. We speculate that the 
differential attention to objects and relations contributes to the analogical gap between humans 
and other primates. 
Experimental Procedures 
 Subjects: twenty-four three-year-old children (mean age = 41 months, range = 36–48 
months), five bonobos (Pan paniscus), seven chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and six orangutans 
(Pongo abelii) (mean age = 14.5 years, range = 6-34 years). All parents/guardians gave informed 
consent for their children’s participation; approved by the Institutional Review Board of 
Northwestern University. The great apes’ study was approved by the joint ethics committee of 
the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology and the Zoo Leipzig. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to Aligned (12 children, 6 Pan (2 bonobos and 4 
chimpanzees), 3 Pongo) or Shifted condition (12 children, 6 Pan (3 bonobos and 3 
chimpanzees), 3 Pongo). Participants stayed within the same condition (Aligned or Shifted) 
across Phases 1 and 2.  
 Material and Procedure. In Phase 1, six identical wooden round containers with lids 
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were used—three in each box. In Phase 2, each box had three containers: a red and black lacquer 
bowl-like object with lid, a green oblong metal container with a pedestal and conical-shaped lid, 
and a yellow rectangular tin with lid. Children and apes performed search and retrieval as 
described in the Results and Discussion. Each child had 9 trials (9 searches and retrievals) and 
each ape had 18 trials in each phase. Further details are described in the Supplemental 
Experimental Procedure. 
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Figure Legends: 
Figure 1. Experimental set-up for Phase 1 – Relational Similarity Only. Subjects saw a bait 
hidden in one of the three containers on the left box (Hiding Box 1), and they had to search 
among the containers on the right box (Search Box 2). All containers were identical. In the 
Aligned condition the correct mapping between Hide and Search is the parallel spatial relations. 
In the Shifted condition, the correct mapping is non-parallel, as indicated by the connecting lines. 
If subjects are sensitive to relational similarity, they should perform better in the Aligned than in 
the Shifted condition. 
 
Figure 2. Experimental set-up for Phase 2 – Relational vs. Object Similarity. Subjects 
maintained the same mapping conditions (Aligned or Shifted) as in Phase 1, but the boxes now 
had distinctive containers. The containers were arranged such that in the Aligned condition, the 
visible object matches competed with the relationally aligned rule; but in the Shifted condition, 
the object matches were consistent with the (arbitrary) correspondence rule. Greater attention to 
object matches over relational matches would favor performance in the Shifted over the Aligned 
condition. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of correct searches during Phase 1. Children and Pan searched at the 
correct location significantly more often in the Aligned than in the Shifted condition. Pongo 
searched at chance level in both conditions, *p <.05 between conditions. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of correct searches during Phase 2. In this phase the relational mapping 
pattern was in conflict with object similarity. In contrast to Phase 1, children searched incorrectly 
in the Aligned condition, but excelled in the Shifted condition (in which the correct answer 
follows object similarity). Pan and Pongo searched at chance level in both Shifted and Aligned 
conditions, *p <.05 between conditions. 
 
Figure 1.  
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